



If this time I was the Platoon
 against 5 SPL. B Company (Co)
 RAR.

My Org: B Coy

Cap/Headquarters
 2 x Offrs



Org of SPL



10 men (auth)

Usually about 7 men in practice

* Op Corbung was the start
 of the VET offensive @ '68

It has just occurred to me that I have no
 record anywhere of what an op in Vietnam felt like
 or looked like or any of the thousand and one
 details which, taken together, made an op.
 So I'm going to take this op of Corbung
 and try to accurately put down what I saw and
 something of how I felt during that op.
 I would start right at the beginning before we
 even know it was on.

It was the 23rd of the month, two days
 previous we had returned from an eleven day
 op. It had been a very quiet op for us and I
 would a bludge. We'd been told that we were
 to be in Camp for about 12 days on the completely
 flat that op and in the 12 days we were to carry
 out base improvements which largely meant
 filling sandbars and doing a bit of digging
 which

them, the water was
 was 100% 1

① Coy Standby - we'd been the Battalion reaction company the night before. That meant that we were on 30 minutes notice is more if called. Thus we were not able to come in after the night before.

② CSM Sp Coy = Company Sergeant Major of Support Company.

③ Charlie = Victor Charlie, VC = Viet Cong. We tended to use the name Charlie for the enemy both North Vietnamese or Viet Cong (South Vietnamese National Liberation Front).

④ CO = Commanding Officer

⑤ Potky Seven = Each Battalion had within its area a helicopter pad. We were 7RAR and our nickname was The Pig's, thus 'Potky Seven'.

⑥ 274 Regt was a VC main force regiment of 3 Battalions.

⑦ 273 Regt, 88A Regt were both North Vietnamese (PAVN) each of the same size. In essence we had 2 Australian battalions fighting about 9 enemy battalions.

2.

I'd put my platoon to work, and was wading through some of administration, it was about 1800 so I decided to wander down to the mess for some morning tea and to hear what the creekers from the previous night's drinking had to say (Coy standing by).

Morning tea was pretty thick and there wasn't much being said until the CSM of Sp Coy said to his Major P. Sp Coy 'I'll need a bush strength state to day as we're going out tomorrow. This aroused various comment such as 'So much for our twelve days, where the hell they sending us now, and how bloody long will it be?'

That I know, but I believe it's up at Bearcat. Charlie's going to attack it.

This gave us quite something to think


on. Bearcat was the HQ of 9 US Inf Div. and if this was true about Charlie attacking it, it meant something bigger than we'd previously come up against was on the plate.

That afternoon the CO had a BR briefing at Potky Seven. It was pretty much as we'd thought, evidently Charlie was intending to hit either Long Binh, Bearcat or Bien Hoa. Our part in the op along with 2RAR was to go to an area NE of Long Binh and search out Charlie. The 2/3 US Inf Bn had been in that area for 10 or 11 days and had been in contact spasmodically each day and night. It seemed that local guerrillas were providing a screen for main force units - preventing the Yanks from making contact with and destroying them. The units identified thus far were 2/274, 2/273, 2/88A of which

3. FSB = Fire Support Base. A temporary base wherein was deployed our artillery to provide support for the infantry.

1) AMC = Air Mobile Company - 20 x UH-1H helicopters (each containing 10 passengers) carries about 30 passengers.
So we had 6 very large and 40 smaller helicopters left in us. They were accompanied by 1000+ helo gunships, all of which rocketed and machine-gunned the landing zone (LZ) prior to our landing.
2) Soft skinned vehicles - non armored vehicles such as trucks etc.

3) In this Base line Search diagram it went thus



were VC in the other PAVN.
The Bn plan was to move 2 Coy's on the conveyer. FSB was in the West of the Bn was to fly in. The 1st company was to move at 0900 and the fly in at 121230. Our coy was to fly in and after some stuff in ground on the LZ we left about 1300. The bn was taken in one lift. There were 2 AMC + 6 CH-47 IETA were 1400 hrs.
24. The rd conveyer had about 90 soft skinned vehicles in it and made a juicy target but luckily got there without incident. The fly in was uneventful too. We landed in a big clearing and studded about it for half an hour till we limbed up with our coy. Then our pl leading we moved about 900m to the place selected for our coy base. The move took us a while as the going was a bit rough we had to cross a waist deep stream which ensured we'd be nice and wet hoochery up that evening - which we were.

The only contact in the Bn was a sighting by A Coy who engaged a VC at 400m and missed him.
25th. We patrolled in the morning didn't see anything except the mess the vehicles had left. There was no contact in the Bn that day, we camped in the same spot that night.
26th. The coy moved on the Base line Search method 6 PL on the left 5 on the right CH-47 in the center. The idea was that 5x6 would go out first move to a point

4
The scout, Ray Dorozuk, came to me after the contact and, hearing me his ripped hat, asked, 'an I get a new hat?' I agreed to get him one on the next resupply. He mentioned that 'Heb, buy a lottery ticket when he got home', I told him not to bother - he'd had all the luck that was likely to get in Vietnam or anywhere else for that matter.

Then prop then HQ would move through them avoiding any close and go on to the Coy base up pos that night. We'd completed the first leg about 1400 m and were harboured on a slight rise when the sounds of machine gun and other small arms were heard - Coy and 4 Pl had moved past us and on the spot the Coy was to harbor spotted some VC on a track to their front. The scout shot the 1st and 2nd Charlie and a third came up and grabbed one of the downed as the scout brought fire to bear on him. A 4th VC opened up on the scout making him go for cover so they ended up with one body and an M1 Carbine.

10A
About an hour later 1/2 my platoon were on patrol checking out a track. They were moving off the track and apparently Charlie was on the track, heard them, and put in an incoming Amb. Charlie initiated the firing and his first burst hit the scout's hat putting a gash in it, knocking him down but miraculously leaving him untouched. There were shots exchanged but no casualties. 4 Pl who were also on ptl. were being followed up by Charlie so they pressed up the area. Again Nil result. Then just before dark 6 Pl made contact, they afterwards found a few marks where Charlie had taken away his wounded or dead and a rather quiet night.

⑩ AK47. Assault Rifle commonly used by enemy. 30 round magazine, Automatic/Semi Automatic

27th Sp Sec killed 2 VC at about 9am
other cogs were in contact that day
with fair result. A quiet night.
28th pl pls our pl made contact 1 VC
KIA + 1 AK47 he was pretty shot up.
no further contact
29th APL Contact Nil result
29th A Coy took 15 Cas. 6 VC KIA They
were rocketed. Saw way 12 was lit by
ex pl comd. 1 friendly KIA - there was
also 1 KIA from 95.

30th Day the other day looks a VC
Coyt 17 ft Cas. No VC Bodies seen
later they searched the camp.
good as pik. pieces every where.
HONG BINH, BIEN HOA rocketed this
night no res as yet. (Pld - Nil res apart
1 x 5 camp from Pic Cable)

31st Resup one bloke black loaded went
ga-ga the night prev. Anxiety cease
apparently. A coy saw a deal its probably
RTA this. Moved later in the day, came
on a VC camp with a KIA, 6 Drum Mags, 10 Grease
gun mags, 6000 rds. Green Russian flares,
Mortar Bombs blew them up. Based
up - dug in, short of time as usual.
1 Feb

One days water has to last two days
is pretty thirsty work digging and you
get very dry - OK for APL who don't
sweat all around the scrub. Stop whinging
water resup coming in.
Moved to another coy amb area,
pld nothing much seen, came on
a Charlie camp which is in the
process of being made - half dug
pits etc.

At about 9.30 that night 4PL spotted some Charles moving in with torches. Five brought to bear. Charlie tipped a few in over our heads - We used illum and arty. Next morning a search revealed a clip of expended M1, an unused clip a torch and a tin Chiminh Sundal evidently they went close as the torch had bullet's car marks on it. ~~the~~ the amb. 6PL old posse. Ben Han, long binh were hit again on the 31st at that time there were 2000 VC Body count. Vom Kiep, Bowie hit night of the 1st we know result as yet ~~but~~ just get word! Lot of VC BC 3RAR and 5Cav were called out by wire an indication for 3 if its true.

Same day 4PL had a contact, missed him!

Later that day 4PL came unexpectedly on our perimeter my pl opened up wounding six of 4PL none seriously thank God. After, whilst the chopper was lowering a bloke from the sling it broke and he fell to the ground and was killed. 6PL on its way into the con base found a VC WIFA and brought him in as a P.W. He was hit during the night's action. Bad luck always chovers near and today 3 Cav had its share.

In the past couple of days our base at Nui Dat and the environs have been going hard at it. 3RAR one alleged to have lost 5 Blakes and killed 60VC.

3 Cars have had 8 M113's hit and taken 1 KIA + 11 WIA. There have also been snipers on the wire and 183 VS Artillery have been mortared and may be rechecked.

VC body count has reached 10500. A massive loss for him.

Things are getting pretty rough here in Vietnam - what the end will be is anybody's guess.

3 Feb - We took a water resupply ^{position}. 3 days which means at least the 6th we're here.

Kill 4 PL had a contact 1 VC KIA.

Possibly two more with a sweep was conducted by 4 PL. Nil result, the VC who was as dead as a maggot, was dragged away by his mate. We got an P PL. Close arty called in.

The VC we took prisoner yesterday evidently spilled his guts and told us where VC 5 Div HQ were - 9 don't know yet what we intend doing about it. - This is a very uncomfortable

position to write in as I'm lying in my pit whilst the arty is brought in along way that's one VC. Less to worry us.

Wrong 2 VC! news it appears two copped it in Loi water my pl went out and followed up the blood trail, we took it carefully but didn't get anyone. I believe Westminster thinks there's a few but more to come, we'll see.

Later that night one of our guns opened up on movement on his front

4 Feb. A sweep next morning had

Nil result. D Coy had a contact

1 VC KIA 1 VAK #7

2) The media, and world opinion generally, considered that the TET offensive of 68 was a defeat for the US/SVN forces. Its interesting that my view and I think it was one we shared is that we had beaten the pants off Charlie!

8

12) The VC body count has now reached 13000. If he can't overthrow the org. Comd and take the country shortly he'll be forced to revert to minor guerrilla tactics again.

The unfortunate part of being out on an op is that although one is proud of the op one hears very little of what is going on in the other areas.

Later my pl went out on amb made contact 1 VC KIA. RPG. Shot up again pretty badly - seems to be a characteristic of this pl that when they zap anyone they do a job of it!!

At the same time as we were in contact CS-4 were. They got 1 VC + Rifle. We made contact again got 1 VC he was right in front of our claymore. He was armed only with a grenade.

The Coy Comd wanted us to stay there but the Brig said no! Received with mixed feelings!!

SAS in contact just after us. We probably drove Charlie flat way! The first Charlie we get had a tube of STRIFE toothpaste on him which I opened to see how the stripe gets in it - ended up toothpaste all over me, still don't know how it gets in! Returned to Coy Pesse - quiet night 5 Feb

We had a very long stand in the morning as our Coy Comd expected some VC to blunder our way.

D Coy had 5 VC KIA this morning they had 1 WIA.

C Coy in fair sized contact so far 5 VC KIA. 1 FE KIA 3 WIA.

We had no luck this day

16 Feb

⑬

C Coy put in a lot of ATG Gunships on the camp we could hear their

contact going. No results yet

Ration Resup, 1 VC spotted as the

chopper came in - they shot through; both Chopper and Charlie.

There were between 40-50 VC in the

camp c were after. C took rocket and MG fire most of yesterday

I'm smoking far too much pipe gone through about 3 packets a day since we've been out.

Continued several pages over

5 PL.

SHIRTS

BAB * 1

BAD * 6

BAE * 11

BAF * 6

BAG * 2

TIRS

BAL * 5

BAM * 1

BAN * 1

BAF * 2

BAR * 9

BAT * 8

BAX * 4

BAY * 1

BAZ * 1

SOCKS

BBS * 1

BBT * 21

BBW * 1

Later that day we came on a bunker complex, attacked it, got one P.W. It was quite like the movies, grenades, bunkers etc. Lots of noise and excitement got to pay the boss - he went into a bunker after the Charlie and brought him out alive - I'd have shot him and been on the same side!

These were pretty fair bunkers. On external appearance they looked like a wall less thatched hut with a slightly raised floor. On closer eye it can be seen that the raised floor is in fact the roof of a bunker with funny bays and shelter bays leading off of each other. There were booby traps spread throughout the camp ranging

19) D8 Claymores - Directional mines either fired by command or with a trip wire

V)

②
from D8 Claymores less 105mm shells
most were unconnected.

When we got into the camp
morning like a bunch of chicken stalks
the VC there evidently thought
we were his mates, as he called out
to us. We spewed, and there were blocks
hiding behind one inch saplings and
taking cover behind matchstick sized
pieces of wood. We thought he'd have
the claymore set up - any way we got
ourselves into an attack posture
and survivors into it - with few
result. We spent the night in
the VC Camp.

7th

Can't say that last night was
one of my most comfortable nights

010-1-1
010-1-2
010-1-3
010-1-4
010-1-5
010-1-6
010-1-7
010-1-8

SAL ASCO

QIA-7

QIB-3

QJC-2

QJA-2

QJC-3

QKK-8

QKB-6

QKC-5

QKD-5 - Books.

A night even so far as to say it was a night of a night - every time a mouse moved I thought it was Charlie coming back. This morning at first light there was a fair sized contact east of us, probably 2 RHR. We started to kill 9 o'clock.

It turned out to be VCay 2 RHR they got 13 VC Bodies and took 18 Cas.

VCay still in contact another 8 Cas. We had a quiet day although I worked on airz all day, felt bugged at the end of it. - No stamina now ^{working} another quiet night

8 Feb

Moved about 700 m dig in car amb/ posh. This ops starting to nose me. Will be quite pleased when its finished; generally.

find that I do get browned of in
about 10 days.

9 Feb (quiet night last night)

We moved south late in the afternoon
based up just short of the clearing we
originally landed in.

10 Feb

Beauty out of here on a CH47

at 0815 Bate to Nui Dat - 9m pleased
that ones over - we were relieved by 3RAR

10

90

90

90

90



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22 Dec 69

00 00000

REPORT ON THE OPERATION - 1/1 1970

Period. 22 Nov - 30 Dec

Area of Ops. 1st Regt TADP. From P8 Lane to the east and south of Unit 08.

Goal Condition. The 1st Regt deployed into the area of P8 Barbara on 9 Nov and cleared 1st Regt, several area small 13 Nov. On 9 Nov, 3/4 Coy was detached to an area east of 13 Lane as security for 17 Nov. On 13 Nov, they they received the on the 13 Nov. On 13 Nov the 1st was redeployed to P8 Lane. The 1st and 1 Coy remaining at home until the end of the op on 16. 2 Coy was used in a search and destroy role in the area south of area initially; then later in the area West of JAVAR Hill. 11 Nov, 1st

Discussion For the best part the op consisted of the patrols by the 1st Coy with area 11 and 12 (houses being used by the 1st Coy) at night. There was one 2 Coy night advance to contact with the 1st unsuccessful because of faulty info.

Remarks The success of this op were largely the result of minimal, well-timed activities. The 1st did not appear to be particularly well-trained or well-armed. The use of a "White-10" and the info received from the 1st were also instrumental in achieving kills. Maintenance was very poor, on both sides.

Recommendations

I have spoken to the 1st and on poor maintenance and as a result appear the 1st were very poor. It was found that in some cases the 1st firing a machine had been, other that had been, was of 1st, but the 1st were not 1st, but to each of 1st.

Development of 1st. The 1st were very poor in the 1st. It has been pointed out that if a word is used in the 1st, it should be used. The 1st were very poor in the 1st. It was found that the 1st were very poor in the 1st. The 1st were very poor in the 1st.

.../2

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AWARD PROPOSAL

Request for the presentation of the Gallantry Cross with Gold Star
(Corps level).

NAME: George Logan
RANK: WO
No.: 36649

REASONS FOR PROPOSAL

WO Logan is an exceptional and brave Adviser and a very experienced combat soldier.

This was shown during Operation Lam Son 349 (phase 2) which lasted from 1-28 Feb 70 in remote Quang Tri Province. WO Logan co-operated to the utmost with 4/1 Battalion in their fighting against the Communists. He disregarded danger and took part in many ambushes which inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy.

The times WO Logan clashed with the enemy he fought very bravely and he also helped 4/1 Battalion by calling in very timely aerial and artillery support, which helped this Battalion achieve honourable victory during phase 2 of Operation Lam Son 349.

WO Logan is very worthy of receiving the above award.

AP0 4895 dated 14 Mar 70
Maj Gen NGO QUANG TRUONG
HQ 1st Inf Div
HQ II CTZ
(signed & Sealed)

Comments: "Worthy"

AP0 4109 dated 2 Apr 70
Lt.Gen HOANG XUAN LAM
HQ 1 Corps
HQ 1 CTZ
(Signed & Sealed)

THE IDES OF MARCH – VIETNAM 1970

The 'Ideas of March' ancient Roman days to the crossword devotee and a famous line in Shakespeare's 'Julius Caesar' has a more recent connection to me.

In March of 1970 I was an Australian Army Warrant Officer serving as an adviser to a South Vietnamese Infantry Battalion in Thua Thien Province in the North of (then) South Vietnam. All up the Battalion mustered about 400 in operations.

In early March my battalion was to be helicoptered into an operational area to tackle some North Vietnamese Army Units (NVA) located there. I had been allotted to advise the 1st Company of the Battalion accompanied by a US Army Lieutenant from the 101st Airborne Division who was on detachment to us.

Due to bad weather (it was the tail end of the rainy season) the assault by helicopter was postponed on various successive days. In the end the American's time with us expired and he had to return to his parent unit.

This left me on my own with the Vietnamese Company. I was happy enough with that arrangement but my US Team Leader, a Captain, was not. He would not allow me to travel without another US soldier with me – "Its Military Assistance Command – Vietnam policy that advisers have to be in pairs." The fact that I had previously worked alone with the Vietnamese seemed to be lost on him but he wouldn't be budged from his position. All that was to change very shortly!

Several days later I flew into the Battalion's operational zone in company with the Team Leader. The next day the 1st Company flew into their LZ (Landing Zone) – some three kilometres away without an adviser!

It appeared 1st Company had landed in a hornets nest and were under mortar fire and in sporadic contact. It was then that the Team Leader approached me and asked if I would fly in to join 1st Company on the ground. I found it rather ironic that the Team Leader wouldn't send me in prior to the assault because he didn't want me to operate on my own. However, once the fight had started he didn't have any qualms about asking me to join them – on my own.

Getting to the 1st Company LZ was going to be interesting. The LZ was being mortared and the US helicopter pilot was not keen on settling his

chopper on a pad that was erupting in explosions.

We had a discussion about the situation and he agreed that he would swoop low over the LZ, hover briefly, I would leap out with my Vietnamese radio operator and the chopper would fly on.

On the first pass my little Vietnamese radio operator thought that the six or seven foot jump was a bit too much and he couldn't be prised from the ship. The pilot and myself had a heated conversation over the intercom to the effect that he would take us back for one more pass (by this time we were orbiting safely out of harm's way) then if we didn't exit the aircraft he was aborting the mission.

I entwined myself in the Vietnamese soldier's webbing and when we swung back over the LZ, I jumped – dragging the Vietnamese with me. We hit the ground in a daze and a tangle of arms and legs – somewhat stunned! By the time we had collected ourselves and sought cover from the mortars – they had stopped and the only noise to be heard was that of the departing chopper.

I figured the Company was lying low – under cover – and after a few minutes – when they were sure the mortaring had stopped, they would come for us. The minutes ticked by and still there was no sign of the Company.

I got on to the radio and asked my Team Leader where the company were? "Gee, they should be with you." He reported. "I*** know that – but they are not here!" was my frantic bleat. Eventually we got it sorted out and the Company appeared. Very sensibly they had moved down the slope away from the LZ. Fortunately they had moved west. If they had moved east they would have been history. It seems that 1st Company had really landed in a hornets' nest and were in the midst of an NVA Regimental Headquarters and four infantry battalions. We were out gunned and outnumbered in ratio 16:1 but I didn't know that – as yet.

I called in a number of air strikes against enemy positions on the 12th, 13th and 14th. By this time I was a bit browned off with what I saw as the reluctance of the Vietnamese to press home their attacks. I didn't know about the NVA being in such large numbers – but my Vietnamese did!

On the afternoon of the 14th we were joined by another Vietnamese Company accompanied by

two Americans. It was then that big mouthed me insisted that we attack the position in a two Company attack on the 15th March. The Vietnamese reluctantly agreed. After all, I had blackmailed them by stating that if they didn't attack on the next day then I would refuse to provide any air support for the entire operation. We agreed on a plan of attack which was to start on the morning of the 15th – The Ides of March!

Our fire support was provided by US helicopters since we were out of range of artillery except for our battalion mortars that were with Battalion Command Post about three kilometres from our location.

It was during the preliminary phase of the attack that I found out what we were facing.

An Airborne Scout Team (an assault team comprising an observation heli backed up by two helicopter gunships) reported that below him was 'The biggest Goddam bunch of slopes I've seen in eighteen months.' He reported up to sixty enemy bunkers, mess huts, lecture huts and assembly areas and many, many enemy. By this time our casualties were increasing (we ended up with some 40 or so out of a total of about 160 personnel) and things were not looking up. Suddenly, a swarm of helicopters appeared overhead attacking various positions around us, apparently at random.

What we, on the ground, didn't know was that in amongst the gear we had sent back with our wounded in the previous days were some captured documents showing that we had landed amongst the 7th NVA Regiment and giving their locations.

My Team Leader came up on the radio and asked if I would take our wounded into a new LZ. "Sure," I replied, "if you can get us out of here. Is the new LZ secured?" "Negative," came the response, "but it looks like we've got no option!" I could not but agree and we arranged the evacuation.

We could only land one ship at a time at our location and after much effort I loaded up four helicopters in turn with a mixture of wounded and unwounded soldiers and we set off.

Once again I was forced to jump from the chopper at the new LZ as it was not secure and the US ship captain would not put his skids on an unsecured LZ. I landed, made the quickest visual search of an LZ ever and declared the LZ secure.

There was more drama as we dragged the Vietnamese wounded off the chopper to allow the birds to go back for more troops. The wounded troops thought, quite reasonably, that since they were wounded they would be evacuated to hospital. To end up in a jungle clearing not much different from the one they'd just left was a bit much for some. It took a few hefty whacks and a cocked .45 automatic to persuade some that the best course of action was to leave the choppers.

Once we were on the ground things kinda sorted themselves out. I called Medevac choppers from Quang Tri, some twenty minutes airtime from us and the nearest hospital, and the helicopters in our location kept on evacuating our soldiers from the hot LZ we'd left.


By the end of the day we had cleared all our soldiers from the hot LZ, sent 40 of them to Quang Tri and were awaiting a series of B52 airstrikes to destroy the enemy positions.




In the early hours of the next morning the B52s struck! For those who have not heard a B52 airstrike it is earshattering. For those who are the targets it must be like the worst visions of Hell!

The weather by this time had 'socked us in' at our landing zone (constant rain and visibility of about twenty metres). We could not get helicopters either in or out of our location. For the next 14 days we waited in the rain and clouds for evacuation, fending off enemy probes, although no full scale attacks- I suspect we were being contacted by small groups of enemy who had survived the B52 strikes but who were gravely disorganised.

At the end of that time we were flown back to base for a two day rest and then went on to a new operation. I never found out if we achieved anything as a result of our activities, but I can say with some authority that when I hear the expression, 'Beware the Ides of March' – I know what they mean!

By George Logan





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- 2 -

Number of CAS

Priority

KIA : 3
MIA : 5

Event

KIA : 74
MIA : Unknown
PW : 4

Contained Materials

1 12mm Gun
600 20mm Gun
1 60mm Gun
110 60mm AT Rocket
80 82mm AT Rocket
24 81mm Mortar
3 120mm Mortar
1 50mm Gun
1 60mm Gun
1 Pistol
1 M-16 Rifle
1 M-16 Rifle
20 M-16 Rifles
1 M-16 Carb.
Approx 500 lbs. mine
500 traps - mostly US (U.S. area and Fortnum II Corps)

(G. 20340)
100
1000

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