Showing 16 items
matching divisional tactics
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4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet, Doctrine for the Tactical Handling of the Division & Armoured Division, 1942
... Divisional tactics... Macleod melbourne Doctrine Divisional tactics Armour Issued ...Soft covered booklet setting out the doctrine for handling of Divisions and Armoured Divisions in Home ForcesIssued by the Commander-in-Chief Home Forcesdoctrine, divisional tactics, armour -
Bendigo Military Museum
Uniform - UNIFORM IRAQ, C. 2005
Uniform worn in Iraq by Greg Westhead. Greg enlisted in the Australian Army in 1974 and served in the Royal Australian Armoured Corp, He was discharged in 1977. He re enlisted in 1982 and joined the Military Police. In 1999 served on exchange with the British Army on a 6 month exchange.While on exchange served in Bosnia. In 2000 he received Commander 2nd Division Commendation for services to Training in defensive Tactics and Close Personel Protection. In 2004 he received a Conspicious Service Medal in the Australia Day Honours list. He was appointed Regimental Sergeant Major 1st Military Battalion.Uniform from Iraq Desert pattern, May. - Nov 2005 .1) Shirt with “MP” sleeves attached .2) pants .3) Hat .4) Goggles .5) & .6) Boots .7) Vest with 1 sterile wound dressing pack in pocket uniforms-army, desert pattern, westhead -
Bendigo Military Museum
Artwork, other - BOOK, 1917
Part of the Grinton collection which included hundreds of negatives and developed photos taken by Jack Grinton during WW1. Refer Cat No 1280 for service details. Refer 1317P, 1320P.Black fabric covered exercise book with graph printed pages. Contains colour hand drawings, writing in ink relating to bombing, gas warfare, weapons, tactics etc. heading on page 4 with floral decoration "Bombing notes from the 2nd ANZAC B & JM School Morbecque 17/10/17, No 1043 L/Cpl JW Grinton 38th"On inside cover in ink: "No 1043 L/Cpl JW Grinton, C Company. 38th battalion 10th INF Brigade, 3rd Division AIF. C Coy Bombing and Gas NCO"military, war fare, pen and ink -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet, Operations Military Training Pamphlet No 23 Part X The Infantry Division in the Advance 1941, 1941
Soft covered booklet dealing with the considerations of the advance of an Infantry DivisionNot to be published Document must not fall into enemy handsinfantry tactics, world war 2 -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet, McLaren & Co Pty Ltd, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components. Military Training Pamphlet No 41 Part 2. The Armoured Regiment 1943, 1943
Soft covered booklet. Superseded the 1940 edition.Warning about communicating content to any person or the press.armour tactics, world war 2 -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet (2 copies), Victorian Railways Printing Works, Tactical Handling of Army Tank Battalions Military Training Pamphlet No 22 Part III: Employment 1939, 1941
Soft covered booklet. As modified for Australia in 1941.Not to be taken forward of Divisional Headquarters.tank tactics, world war 2 -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet (2 copies), Modern Printing Co Pty Ltd, M.E.T.P. No 2 Part VIII Tactical Handling of Armoured Divisions in the Middle East, 1940's
Paper covered bookletarmoured tactics, middle east, world war 2 -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components. Mil Training Pam No 41 Part 3. The Motor Battalion 1943, 1943
... Armoured Division Tactics... Macleod melbourne Armoured Division Tactics World War 2 Soft ...Soft covered bookletarmoured division tactics, world war 2 -
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment Unit History Room
Booklet, The Division in battle Pam No 1 Organization and Tactics 1965, 1965
A soft covered loose leaf booklet describing the employment of the division, its concept of operations, and the roles, organisation, characteristics and tasks of divisional unitsDSN 7610-66-023-4924the division, the division -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Booklet, Australian Army: The division in battle, pamphlet No. 1: Organisation and tactics, 1965 (2 copies), 1965
australia - armed forces - service manuals -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Booklet, Australian Army: The division in battle, pamphlet No. 1: Organisation and tactics, 1970 (4 copies), 1965
australia - armed forces - service manuals -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Photograph, Leadership group the day before the Battle of Ngok Tavak, 9/05/1968 12:00:00 AM
Captain John E D White, Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV) took over command of 11 Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) Company in Da Nang, Vietnam, in February 1968. He was 26 years old. The 2 NVA Division was moving from Laos into South Vietnam and his mission was to establish contact with the division and trace its movements south. In mid-March the company was air lifted to the Special Forces camp of Kham Duc, near the Laotian border. They used an old French Foreign Legion fort as a temporary base from which patrols could be sent out. White called it Ngok Tavak after a nearby mountain. Initially, patrols failed to find the enemy, but in late April a patrol clashed with the enemy. At the same time, White received intelligence that the NVA division was closing in. At night they could hear explosions in the distance heading toward them. White decided their best chance was to leave the fort and take to the jungle to adopt guerrilla tactics. However, in the meantime a platoon of United States Marine Corps artillery arrived bringing with them two howitzers and a stockpile of ammunition. To abandon the fort was to abandon the guns. White contacted Da Nang, explaining the predicament, and was ordered to remain where he was. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon was sent to reinforce his numbers. This was a para military force comprised mainly of indigenous highlanders, trained by United States Special Forces. They also brought with them two mortars and their crews. At 3.15am on 10 May 1968 some members of the CIDG chose to assist the NVA to attack the fort instead of supporting Mike Force, and close hand to hand fighting followed, along with grenade attacks and heavy machine gun fire. Air support offered a brief respite from the NVA attack, and some NVA forces were pushed back outside the perimeter by counter attacks, but at 9am White contacted Da Nang to advise that his position was untenable. A second attack was imminent and they could not withstand it, so they would have to withdraw. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter (under orders from Major Mai, the NVA had not attacked the previous medical helicopters that collected the wounded under the cover of air strikes) and at 1pm the rest of the force evacuated east, into the jungle. The NVA did not notice their withdrawal, and continued mortar attacks on the fort for another ninety minutes. Seven kilometres from the fort White called for a helicopter withdrawal of his forces. The force was successfully lifted to Kham Duc and then Da Nang. (Credit AWM)Coloured image of 7 soldiers (5 shirtless) posed on the edge of a foxhole with jungle in background. L-R Willie Swicegood (USA), John White (AATTV-Aus), Ken Benway (USA), Frank Lucas (Aust), Clay Aitkins (USA), Glenn Miller (USA), Don Cameron (Aust)john white, aattv, battle of ngok tavak -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Banner - Banner, framed, 11 Co (Nung)
Captain John E D White, Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV) took over command of 11 Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) Company in Da Nang, Vietnam, in February 1968. He was 26 years old. The 2 NVA Division was moving from Laos into South Vietnam and his mission was to establish contact with the division and trace its movements south. In mid-March the company was air lifted to the Special Forces camp of Kham Duc, near the Laotian border. They used an old French Foreign Legion fort as a temporary base from which patrols could be sent out. White called it Ngok Tavak after a nearby mountain. Initially, patrols failed to find the enemy, but in late April a patrol clashed with the enemy. At the same time, White received intelligence that the NVA division was closing in. At night they could hear explosions in the distance heading toward them. White decided their best chance was to leave the fort and take to the jungle to adopt guerrilla tactics. However, in the meantime a platoon of United States Marine Corps artillery arrived bringing with them two howitzers and a stockpile of ammunition. To abandon the fort was to abandon the guns. White contacted Da Nang, explaining the predicament, and was ordered to remain where he was. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon was sent to reinforce his numbers. This was a para military force comprised mainly of indigenous highlanders, trained by United States Special Forces. They also brought with them two mortars and their crews. At 3.15am on 10 May 1968 some members of the CIDG chose to assist the NVA to attack the fort instead of supporting Mike Force, and close hand to hand fighting followed, along with grenade attacks and heavy machine gun fire. Air support offered a brief respite from the NVA attack, and some NVA forces were pushed back outside the perimeter by counter attacks, but at 9am White contacted Da Nang to advise that his position was untenable. A second attack was imminent and they could not withstand it, so they would have to withdraw. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter (under orders from Major Mai, the NVA had not attacked the previous medical helicopters that collected the wounded under the cover of air strikes) and at 1pm the rest of the force evacuated east, into the jungle. The NVA did not notice their withdrawal, and continued mortar attacks on the fort for another ninety minutes. Seven kilometres from the fort White called for a helicopter withdrawal of his forces. The force was successfully lifted to Kham Duc and then Da Nang. (Credit AWM)Black framed glass covered flag. Red material with gold fringe, gold writing with Blackbird in the centre with parachute holding 2 white swords standing on a gold star. 11Co. in gold underneath. Gold plaque mounted under the flag.GUIDON OF 11 COY (NUNG) MOBILE STRIKE FORCE (MIKE FORCE) /5th SF GROUP, 1 CORPS, SVN/ A Significant number of AATTV personnel served with this Nung Company based in Da Nang./ At the end of the Vietnam War, this flag was taken by a former US SF officer and held until/ when it was given to former Captain John "Jed" White (AATTV), CO 11 Coy (Nung), who led/ the MIKE Forces at the Battle of Ngok Tavak on 10 May 1968.battle of ngok tavak, mobile strike force, nung, john white -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Photograph, Captain John White, AATTV, arrives in Vietnam, January 1968, 1/01/1968 12:00:00 AM
Captain John E D White, Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV) took over command of 11 Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) Company in Da Nang, Vietnam, in February 1968. He was 26 years old. The 2 NVA Division was moving from Laos into South Vietnam and his mission was to establish contact with the division and trace its movements south. In mid-March the company was air lifted to the Special Forces camp of Kham Duc, near the Laotian border. They used an old French Foreign Legion fort as a temporary base from which patrols could be sent out. White called it Ngok Tavak after a nearby mountain. Initially, patrols failed to find the enemy, but in late April a patrol clashed with the enemy. At the same time, White received intelligence that the NVA division was closing in. At night they could hear explosions in the distance heading toward them. White decided their best chance was to leave the fort and take to the jungle to adopt guerrilla tactics. However, in the meantime a platoon of United States Marine Corps artillery arrived bringing with them two howitzers and a stockpile of ammunition. To abandon the fort was to abandon the guns. White contacted Da Nang, explaining the predicament, and was ordered to remain where he was. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon was sent to reinforce his numbers. This was a para military force comprised mainly of indigenous highlanders, trained by United States Special Forces. They also brought with them two mortars and their crews. At 3.15am on 10 May 1968 some members of the CIDG chose to assist the NVA to attack the fort instead of supporting Mike Force, and close hand to hand fighting followed, along with grenade attacks and heavy machine gun fire. Air support offered a brief respite from the NVA attack, and some NVA forces were pushed back outside the perimeter by counter attacks, but at 9am White contacted Da Nang to advise that his position was untenable. A second attack was imminent and they could not withstand it, so they would have to withdraw. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter (under orders from Major Mai, the NVA had not attacked the previous medical helicopters that collected the wounded under the cover of air strikes) and at 1pm the rest of the force evacuated east, into the jungle. The NVA did not notice their withdrawal, and continued mortar attacks on the fort for another ninety minutes. Seven kilometres from the fort White called for a helicopter withdrawal of his forces. The force was successfully lifted to Kham Duc and then Da Nang. (Credit AWM)Coloured image of John (Jed) White, aged 26 arriving at Tan Son Nhut Airport in full uniform, bag straps over left shoulder. Close- up of chest and head with plane visible in the background.AWM - p 11058,001capt john (jed) white, aattv, battle of ngok tavak -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Plaque, Mobile Strike Force Shield
Captain John E D White, Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV) took over command of 11 Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) Company in Da Nang, Vietnam, in February 1968. He was 26 years old. The 2 NVA Division was moving from Laos into South Vietnam and his mission was to establish contact with the division and trace its movements south. In mid-March the company was air lifted to the Special Forces camp of Kham Duc, near the Laotian border. They used an old French Foreign Legion fort as a temporary base from which patrols could be sent out. White called it Ngok Tavak after a nearby mountain. Initially, patrols failed to find the enemy, but in late April a patrol clashed with the enemy. At the same time, White received intelligence that the NVA division was closing in. At night they could hear explosions in the distance heading toward them. White decided their best chance was to leave the fort and take to the jungle to adopt guerrilla tactics. However, in the meantime a platoon of United States Marine Corps artillery arrived bringing with them two howitzers and a stockpile of ammunition. To abandon the fort was to abandon the guns. White contacted Da Nang, explaining the predicament, and was ordered to remain where he was. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon was sent to reinforce his numbers. This was a para military force comprised mainly of indigenous highlanders, trained by United States Special Forces. They also brought with them two mortars and their crews. At 3.15am on 10 May 1968 some members of the CIDG chose to assist the NVA to attack the fort instead of supporting Mike Force, and close hand to hand fighting followed, along with grenade attacks and heavy machine gun fire. Air support offered a brief respite from the NVA attack, and some NVA forces were pushed back outside the perimeter by counter attacks, but at 9am White contacted Da Nang to advise that his position was untenable. A second attack was imminent and they could not withstand it, so they would have to withdraw. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter (under orders from Major Mai, the NVA had not attacked the previous medical helicopters that collected the wounded under the cover of air strikes) and at 1pm the rest of the force evacuated east, into the jungle. The NVA did not notice their withdrawal, and continued mortar attacks on the fort for another ninety minutes. Seven kilometres from the fort White called for a helicopter withdrawal of his forces. The force was successfully lifted to Kham Duc and then Da Nang. (Credit AWM)A wooden shield painted grey/black celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Ngok Tavak. There are three messages from mates written in black on the back. The shield was presented to Capt John (Jed) White.Presented to Captain John White, AATTV from the men of the Mobile Strike Force, Danang, Vietnam, 1968.mobile strike force, capt john (jed) white, shield, battle of ngok tavak -
National Vietnam Veterans Museum (NVVM)
Photograph, Sketch of Battle Map, Ngok Tavak, Mary 1968
Captain John E D White, Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV) took over command of 11 Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) Company in Da Nang, Vietnam, in February 1968. He was 26 years old. The 2 NVA Division was moving from Laos into South Vietnam and his mission was to establish contact with the division and trace its movements south. In mid-March the company was air lifted to the Special Forces camp of Kham Duc, near the Laotian border. They used an old French Foreign Legion fort as a temporary base from which patrols could be sent out. White called it Ngok Tavak after a nearby mountain. Initially, patrols failed to find the enemy, but in late April a patrol clashed with the enemy. At the same time, White received intelligence that the NVA division was closing in. At night they could hear explosions in the distance heading toward them. White decided their best chance was to leave the fort and take to the jungle to adopt guerrilla tactics. However, in the meantime a platoon of United States Marine Corps artillery arrived bringing with them two howitzers and a stockpile of ammunition. To abandon the fort was to abandon the guns. White contacted Da Nang, explaining the predicament, and was ordered to remain where he was. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon was sent to reinforce his numbers. This was a para military force comprised mainly of indigenous highlanders, trained by United States Special Forces. They also brought with them two mortars and their crews. At 3.15am on 10 May 1968 some members of the CIDG chose to assist the NVA to attack the fort instead of supporting Mike Force, and close hand to hand fighting followed, along with grenade attacks and heavy machine gun fire. Air support offered a brief respite from the NVA attack, and some NVA forces were pushed back outside the perimeter by counter attacks, but at 9am White contacted Da Nang to advise that his position was untenable. A second attack was imminent and they could not withstand it, so they would have to withdraw. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter (under orders from Major Mai, the NVA had not attacked the previous medical helicopters that collected the wounded under the cover of air strikes) and at 1pm the rest of the force evacuated east, into the jungle. The NVA did not notice their withdrawal, and continued mortar attacks on the fort for another ninety minutes. Seven kilometres from the fort White called for a helicopter withdrawal of his forces. The force was successfully lifted to Kham Duc and then Da Nang. (Credit AWM)Annotated hand-drawn map of the fort at Ngok Tavak, 10 May 1968.battle of ngok tavak, john white, battle map